A method of reflective equilibrium is adumbrated and then used to test the adequacy of moral conceptions appealing to fundamental human rights against Nietzschean conceptions of morality which would reject such an appeal. There is an attempt here both to articulate and critically probe a distinctive moral methodology (the method of reflective equilibrium) and to examine skeptical challenges to a foundationalism which would ground morality in fundamental rights claims. I attempt a partial testing of such a moral methodology by examining (...) its ability to meet such skeptical challenges to the rational grounding of human rights, and I assess (and this is plainly a reciprocal process) the depth of such skeptical challenges by the ability of such challenges to survive such an application of a method of reflective equilibrium. If that method is applied with discrimination and understanding, is it sufficient to defuse skeptical challenges to the pervasive belief that either rationality or the very taking of the moral point of view requires the acceptance of the belief that the design of morally acceptable social institutions and practices must be such that they aim at achieving a state of affairs in which all human beings are to be afforded equal consideration? Can a method of reflective equilibrium establish that a good society must embody such a commitment to an equality of human rights? (shrink)

There is a practical five-step method of ethics dialog developed by John Woolman, an 18th c. businessman and ethical activist, that was used by Robert K. Greenleaf, a 20th c. A.T.&T. Corporate Vice-President, that includes: (a) friendly, emotive affect; (b) discussion of mutual commonalities; (c) discussion of issue entanglements; (d) discussion of potential experimental solutions; and, (e) trial and feedback discussion. This method of dialog appears to proceed with a type of consciousness considered by John Woolman and Bernard Lonergan as (...) one where the I is conscious that I and Others are part of a more foundational, larger and prior We. This type of dialog is different than Socratic dialog. The corresponding type of consciousness is different than the more derivative, e.g., two allies being united in their response to a common goal. It is also different than Buber's I and Thou appreciative consciounsess of the interestingness, value, diversity, and uniqueness of others. Woolman dialog as seen in four cases appears to be a concrete method that has some value both as an end in itself and as instrumental means that can: be issue effective, help build ethical organization/community culture, and help facilitate peaceful, evolutionary change and development. Limitations of the method are also considered. The method may also be a several hundred year anticipation of experiment based pragmatist philosophy that is anthropologically sensitive to cultural entanglements. No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe, ... Each is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.... John Donne (17th c.). (shrink)

That PTSD nightmares are highly realistic threat simulations triggered by trauma is difficult to reconcile with the disturbed, sometimes debilitating sleep and waking functioning of PTSD sufferers. A theory that accounts for fundamental forms of imagery other than threat scenarios could explain the selection of many more adaptive human functions – some still pertinent to survival today. For example, interactive characters, a virtually ubiquitous form of dream imagery, could be simulations of attachment relationships that aid species survival in many different (...) ways. [Revonsuo]. (shrink)

Mr. Barker examines the efforts of Keynes, Reichenbach, Carnap, Williams, Popper, Kemeny and others in their search for the rationale of experimental inference. On what paradigm of reasoning does empirical knowledge depend? Some philosophers suppose it to be induction by enumeration, others induction by elimination, but Mr. Barker sees hope in a modified version of the hypothetico-deductive method. Our knowledge, he explains, forms a’ system ‘in which the fates of various bits are bound together. Philosophers are misled when they speak (...) as if we could confirm a hypothesis that stands alone. Instead, we ought to count one hypothesis better confirmed than its rival ‘if and only if there is some system including the former and the evidence which is somehow than any system including the latter and the evidence’. Here he brings in Kemeny’s ‘logical measure’ of simplicity, read in terms of the number of ways in which two systems of hypotheses can be true in an membered universe. Mr. Barker does not go into the application of this enormous Apparat, nor does he explain the sense of ‘system’ which is supposed to go with his examples of hypotheses, e.g., ‘There’s a cat behind the sofa’. (shrink)

This book offers a sustained scholarly analysis of Gadamer's reflections on art and our experience of art. It examines fundamental themes in Gadamer's hermeneutical aesthetics such as play, festival, symbol, contemporaneity, enactment, art's performative ontology, and hermeneutical identity. The first two chapters focus on Gadamer's critical appropriation and movement beyond Kantian and Hegelian aesthetics (and includes a coda on Heidegger's influence). The final three chapters argue for the continued relevance of Gadamer's hermeneutical aesthetics by bringing his claims into conversation with (...) contemporary art and music, as well as the ethical and sociopolitical dimensions of the Artworld and art-praxis. The ethical and sociopolitical aspects of art- and music-making are given particular attention in chapters devoted to 20th century African American artist Romare Bearden, Banksy's street art, and a range of jazz expressions, from traditional jazz to the complex practice of free jazz. Gadamer's Hermeneutical Aesthetics will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on Gadamer, philosophical hermeneutics, continental philosophy, aesthetics, and the philosophy of contemporary art and music. (shrink)

IN his Reason and Goodness Blanshard has posed the following question for moral philosophers: ‘When we decide that a certain action is right or our duty, what is it that does the deciding? Our reason? Our feeling? or both’. On a superficial or slight acquaintance with either Hume or the emotivists, we are likely to respond: ‘Why, feeling only! Emotion is central in morality. Reason is but a slave or a servant of the passions; the final reasons we can give (...) for any moral claim are “exciting reasons”—our dispositions to be for or against something.’. (shrink)

This paper attempts to uncover some of the factors that may have influenced the choice of model for the systematic training of nurses in Denmark. From a historical analysis of selected historical literature, nursing magazines, and archival documents, three themes emerge: the interest from (and of) the medical profession, the strategy on nurse training of the Danish Nurses’ Organization, and the societal context of the time. Despite there being a Deaconess Institution in Copenhagen from 1863, it was ultimately the Nightingale (...) model that formed the basis for the training programme. Findings suggest that the Nightingale influence within the medical establishment and among leaders in Danish nursing played a vital role in this choice. As well, the Danish Nurses’ Organization actively promoted their preferred 3‐year training model, which had strong similarities to the Nightingale model. Changes in family and social life after the 1864 defeat in the Prussian war fostered a growing demand for the liberalization of women's rights and a need for increased professionalization in the nursing and caring function. (shrink)

Absurdo y rebelión son dos conceptos fundamentales dentro de la obra de Albert Camus. En el terreno filosófico su significado ha sido ampliamente estudiado y debatido. Por lo mismo, este artículo tiene como propósito abordar ambas nociones desde una perspectiva distinta, planteando que tanto absurdo como rebelión pueden ser entendidos como fenómenos o experiencias verbales. Dado este enfoque, el estudio propone una relación entre los planteamientos de Camus y autores cuyas obras exhiben una actitud radicalmente crítica y experimental hacia el (...) lenguaje: Samuel Beckett, Alejandra Pizarnik, Oliverio Girondo, entre otros. El estudio se ocupa de identificar y fundamentar esas conexiones, sobre la base de una pregunta esencial: ¿qué consecuencias tiene la experimentación y transformación del lenguaje? (shrink)

Patients sometimes visit their general practitioners with more than one concern. This article investigates when and how patients initiate presentations of such additional concerns. The study is conversation analytic in its approach and scope. It is based upon video-recordings of naturally occurring general practice consultations in Denmark. Data suggest that Danish patients relatively frequently initiate presentations of additional concerns and defer such initiations until moments when the parties would otherwise engage in closing down the consultations. Additional concerns are introduced in (...) response to the doctor’s possible pre-closing remarks. The parties, thereafter, employ a set of transitional elements: confirmation, preliminary announcement and ratification. This transition enables the parties to recycle the activities of the visit, to discuss and examine yet another concern. Thus, additional concerns are not presented completely unexpectedly or randomly as commonsense understanding sometimes has it; they are introduced at orderly moments and by means of recognizable methods. (shrink)

Kai Nielsen is one of Canada's most distinguished political philosophers. In a career spanning over 40 years, he has published more than 400 papers in political philosophy, ethics, meta-philosophy, and philosophy of religion. Pessimism of the Intellect presents a thoughtful collection of Nielsen's essays complemented by an extended reflective interview with Nielsen. This collection allows the reader to grasp the systematic scope of his thought and methodology.